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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 




WILLIAM J. EINHORN, ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
TEAMSTERS PENSION TRUST FUND OF PHILADELPHIA 
& VICINITY and THE TEAMSTERS HEALTH AND 
WELFARE FUND OF PHILADELPHIA & VICINITY, 
 




FLEMING FOODS OF PENNSYLVANIA, INC. 
 
ON APPEAL FROM THE 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
(Dist. Court No. 99-cv-04328) 
District Court Judge: Clarence C. Newcomer 
 
Argued: March 7, 2001 
 
Before: ALITO, McKEE, Circuit Judges , and KRAVITCH, 
Senior Circuit Judge1 
 





1. Honorable Phyllis A. Kravitch, United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit, sitting by designation. 
  
        FRANK C. SABATINO (argued) 
        JAMES D. CRAWFORD 
        JONATHAN R. NADLER 
        Schnader, Harrison, Segal & 
         Lewis, LLP 
        1600 Market Street, Suite 3600 
        Philadelphia, PA 19103 
 
        Counsel for Appellant 
 
        JEANNE L. BAKKER (argued) 
        HOWARD J. BASHMAN 
        Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & 
         Rhoads, LLP 
        123 South Broad Street 
        Philadelphia, PA 19109 
 
        Counsel for Appellee 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
ALITO, Circuit Judge: 
 
Appellant William J. Einhorn br ought this action under 
Section 515 of the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. S 1145, to collect contributions 
allegedly owed by Appellee Fleming Foods of Pennsylvania 
("Fleming") to multi-employer pension and welfare funds 
that Einhorn administers. The District Court granted 
summary judgment for Fleming. Because we conclude that 
the relevant language of the collective bar gaining 
agreements is ambiguous, we reverse the District Court's 




Until 1997, Fleming employed approximately 163 drivers 
and 13 mechanics as part of its food distribution 
operations. It entered into separate collective bargaining 
agreements ("CBAs") with the drivers ("Drivers' CBA") and 
the mechanics ("Mechanics' CBA"). The Drivers' CBA was in 
effect from July 1, 1994, to June 30, 1997, and the 
Mechanics' CBA was in effect from October 1, 1994, to 
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September 30, 1997. Both CBA's required Fleming to make 
contributions to the Teamsters Pension Fund of 
Philadelphia and Vicinity ("Pension Fund") and the 
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund of Philadelphia and 
Vicinity ("HW Fund"). Fleming's contribution obligations, 
which were the same for both funds, wer e specified in the 
CBA's: 
 
        Contributions to the Fund . . . shall be made for each 
        seniority associate for each day worked, or if not 
        worked, paid for pursuant to the terms of this 
        Agreement covering holidays, vacations and paid sick 
        leave (not worked) to a maximum of eight (8) hours per 
        day or forty (40) hours per week. 
 
App. 70, 84 (Drivers' CBA, art. 9, 25); App. 124-25 
(Mechanics' CBA, art. 32, 33). 
 
In May 1997, Fleming entered into an agr eement with 
Transervice Lease Corporation ("Transervice") under which 
Fleming agreed to "outsource" its drivers and mechanics to 
Transervice. Pursuant to this agreement, Fleming 
terminated its drivers and mechanics when their CBA's 
expired -- on June 30, 1997, for the drivers and on 
September 30, 1997, for the mechanics. Transervice 
became obligated to contribute to the Funds on behalf of 
the drivers and mechanics once they became T ranservice 
employees. 
 
In anticipation of terminating the employees, Fleming 
contacted Frank Gillen, the president of the employees' 
union, and offered to engage in "ef fects" bargaining. The 
parties eventually agreed that Fleming would pay the 
drivers for all of the unused vacation benefits, personal 
days, and sick leave that they had earned as of the day of 
their termination. In addition, Fleming agr eed to pay the 
drivers for the July 4th holiday (which occurr ed after the 
termination of the Drivers' CBA) and for five additional 
unearned sick days. The parties also engaged in "effects" 
bargaining in preparation for the ter mination of the 
Mechanics' CBA. As with the drivers, Fleming agr eed to pay 
the mechanics for all of their earned but unused vacation 
benefits, personal days, and sick leave. 
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Fleming made the necessary lump sum payments to the 
drivers and mechanics on or before their last days of 
employment with the company, but Fleming never made 
any contributions to the Funds based on these payments. 
This dispute followed. On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the District Court awarded summary judgment 




As noted, Einhorn's action is based on Section 515 of 
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. S 1145, which provides that an employer 
"obligated to make contributions to a multiemployer plan 
. . . under the terms of a collectively bar gained agreement 
shall, to the extent not inconsistent with law, make such 
contributions in accordance with the ter ms and conditions 
of . . . such agreement." Einhorn contends that the CBA's 
involved in this case unambiguously requir e Fleming to 
make contributions based on the lump sum payments 
given to the drivers and mechanics prior to the ter mination 
of their employment with that company. Fleming, by 
contrast, maintains that the CBA's unambiguously 
establish that it is not obligated to make such 
contributions. 
 
Although federal law governs the construction of 
collective bargaining agreements, traditional contract 
principles apply when not inconsistent with federal labor 
law. See Teamsters Indus. Employees W elfare Fund v. Rolls- 
Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 989 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1993); 
Sheet Metal Workers, Local 19 v. 2300 Gr oup, Inc., 949 F.2d 
1274, 1284 (3d Cir. 1991). Under these principles, whether 
a contract term is clear or ambiguous is a question of law 
for the court and is thus subject to plenary r eview on 
appeal. See Teamsters Indus. Employees W elfare Fund, 989 
F.2d at 135. "A [contract] ter m is ambiguous if it is 
susceptible to reasonable alternative interpretations." 
Sanford Inv. Co. v. Ahlstrom Mach. Holding, Inc., 198 F.3d 
415, 421 (3d Cir. 1999); Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf 
Coast Trailing Co., 180 F.3d 518, 521 (3d Cir. 1999). In 
determining whether a term is ambiguous, we must 
consider the contract language, the meanings suggested by 
counsel, and the extrinsic evidence offer ed in support of 
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each interpretation. See Rolls-Royce, 989 F.2d at 135. 
Extrinsic evidence may include the structure of the 
contract, the bargaining history, and conduct of the parties 
that reflects their understanding of the contract's meaning. 
See id. Under our precedents, "[i]f the court determines that 
a given term in a contract is ambiguous, then the 
interpretation of that term is a question of fact for the trier 
of fact to resolve in light of the extrinsic evidence offered by 
the parties in support of their respective interpretations." 
Sanford Inv. Co., 198 F.3d at 421. See also, e.g., Newport 
Associates Dev. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. , 162 F.3d 789, 
792 (3d Cir. 1998); Hullett v. Towers, Perrin, Forrester & 




With these principles in mind, we consider the parties' 
sharply different interpretations of the relevant provisions 
of the CBA's. As previously noted, the CBA's pr ovide that 
contributions had to be made for each employee "for each 
day worked, or if not worked, paid for pursuant to the 
terms of [the CBA's] covering holidays, vacations and paid 
sick leave (not worked) to a maximum of eight (8) hours per 
day or forty (40) hours per week." The dispute here 
concerns the obligation to make a contribution"for each 
day . . . not worked [but] paid for [as holiday, vacation, or 
sick pay]." 
 
Fleming interprets the phrase "day . . . not worked [but] 
paid for [as holiday, vacation, or sick pay]" in a concrete 
sense. In its view, the phrase refers to a calendar day 
during which a Fleming employee did not work but was 
paid. Fleming therefore concludes that the lump sum 
payments that it made to the drivers and mechanics at the 
end of their employment as compensation for their unused 
vacation benefits and sick leave did not trigger an 
obligation to make contributions to the funds because, once 
these employees ceased working for Fleming, no calendar 
days occurred during which they were on paid vacation or 
sick leave. Moreover, according to Fleming, the lump sum 
payments may not be allocated to the period prior to the 
expiration of the CBA's because that period has been used 
up, i.e., for all of those days, Fleming has alr eady made 
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contributions based on the maximum of eight hours per 
day and 40 hours per week. Fleming acknowledges that 
provisions in the CBA's required it to pay the drivers and 
the mechanics for their unused vacation benefits when they 
were permanently laid off,2 but Fleming contends that these 
provisions do not address Fleming's separate obligation to 
make contributions to the funds. This obligation, Fleming 
asserts, is controlled entirely by the pr eviously noted 
provisions that tie the contribution obligation to calendar 
days during which the employee either worked or was out 
on paid vacation or sick leave.3 Finally, Fleming takes the 
position that its "effects" agreement with the union was 
itself a collective bargaining agreement and that this 
agreement confirmed that Fleming's contributions would be 
subject to the limitations expressed in the main CBA's. 
 
Einhorn offers an alternative interpretation of the CBAs' 
contribution provisions. Einhorn str enuously argues that 
the CBA's never say that the term "day" means calendar 
day. Under Einhorn's interpretation of that term, as we 
understand it, a "day . . . not worked [but] paid for [as 
holiday, vacation, or sick pay]" is essentially a unit of 
money, not time -- in other words, a day's pay. According 
to Einhorn, the eight-hour per-day and forty-hour-per week 
caps simply limit Fleming's contribution obligation if a 
day's pay was for more than eight hours or a week's pay 
was for more than 40 hours.4 
 
Relying on the CBA provisions stating that Fleming was 
required to make contributions to the funds by the 28th 
day of the month "following the month in which those 
monies were accrued,"5 Einhorn contends that the 
obligation to make contributions "accrued at the same 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. App. 80 (Drivers' CBA, art., 22, sec. 4(b); App. 116 (Mechanics' CBA, 
art. 19.14). 
 
3. App. 70, 84 (Drivers' CBA, art. 9, 25); App. 124-25 (Mechanics' CBA, 
art. 32, 33). 
 
4. Einhorn provides this example. If an employee was on vacation for a 
week, the employee would be paid for 45 hours. Fleming, however, was 
required to make contributions based only 40 hours. 
 
5. App. 69, 84 (Drivers' CBA art. 9, sec. 5; art. 25, sec. 6); App. 123, 
126 
(Mechanics' CBA para. 32.5, 33.5). 
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instant that the employee either worked or became entitled 
to vacation pay." Appellant's Br. at 7-9 (emphasis in 
original). Einhorn further notes (a) that under the CBA's an 
employee became "entitled to vacation pay""[u]pon 
permanent layoff "6 and (b) that the lump sum payments at 
issue here were made before the CBA's expired and the 
employees were terminated. Thus, as Einhorn interprets 
the CBA's, Fleming became obligated to pay the employees 
for unused vacation and sick "days" and in fact made such 
payments before the CBA's ended, and Fleming was 
consequently obligated to make the corresponding 
contributions to the funds. Finally, Einhorn contends that 
Fleming's prior practice was to make contributions when an 
employee was given a lump sum payment. 
 
We conclude that the critical provisions of the CBA's are 
"susceptible of differing meanings." Teamsters Indus. Emp. 
Welfare Fund, 989 F.2d at 135. Turning first to Fleming's 
position, with which the District Court agreed, we believe 
that it is reasonable to interpret the phrase "day . . . not 
worked [but] paid for" to mean an actual day during which 
a Fleming employee did not work but was paid because he 
or she was on vacation or sick leave. Indeed, this is the 
most literal interpretation, and if it is accepted, Fleming is 
not obligated to make the disputed contributions. Although 
Einhorn relies on several other pr ovisions of the CBA's, 
none dictates a contrary result. Einhor n points to the 
provisions stating Fleming was requir ed to make 
contributions by the 28th day of the month following the 
month in which "the monies accrued."7 However, the phrase 
"monies accrued" may be read as r eferring to the payments 
"for day[s] worked, or if not worked, paid for," and if 
Fleming's interpretation of the latter phrase is accepted, the 
lump sum payments made at the end of the CBA's wer e not 
payments for "day[s] . . . not worked." Einhorn also relies 
on the provisions providing that employees became entitled 
to vacation "upon permanent layoff,"8 but this provision 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. App.80 (Drivers' CBA, art., 22, sec. 4(b); App. 116 (Mechanics' CBA, 
art. 19.14). 
 
7. App. 69, 84 (Drivers' CBA art. 9, sec. 5; art. 25, sec. 6); App. 123, 
126 
(Mechanics' CBA para. 32.5, 33.5). 
 
8. App.80 (Drivers' CBA, art., 22, sec. 4(b); App. 116 (Mechanics' CBA, 
art. 19.14). 
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expressly refers only to Fleming's obligations to the 
employees, not to the funds. 
 
Einhorn's interpretation of the phrase"day . . . not 
worked [but] paid for," although less concrete than 
Fleming's, is also consistent with accepted usage. Suppose 
that a person said, "After I was laid off by employer X, I 
began working for employer Y the next day, but X paid me 
for my unused vacation days." The meaning of the 
statement would be obvious -- the person did not actually 
take a vacation but was given the money that would have 
been paid if he or she had he taken a vacation -- and no 
one would think that the statement was linguistically 
peculiar. And if Einhorn's interpr etation of this phrase is 
accepted, it appears that Fleming was obligated to make 
the disputed contributions. Applying Einhorn's 
interpretation, when the lump sum payments wer e made 
(while the CBA's were still in force), the employees were 
paid for a certain number of days not worked, and Fleming 
incurred an obligation to make corresponding 
contributions, an obligation that survived the ter mination 
of the CBA's. See Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 
190, 207 (1991). 
 
We have considered all of the other evidence upon which 
the parties have relied, and we believe that the CBA's 
remain ambiguous and that there is a genuine issue of 
material fact that precludes the entry of summary judgment 
for either side. Accordingly, the decision of the District 
Court must be reversed, and the case must be r emanded to 
the District Court for trial. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
        Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
        for the Third Circuit 
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